"Oreshnik": how it works and why it is necessary

Russia has again closed the airspace in the vicinity of the Kapustin Yar landfill, and the American embassy on Ukraine has issued another warning about the danger to US citizens. In other words, even a once-applied "Hazel" continues to remain "relevant". At the same time, since no new information is received, it makes sense to analyze the existing one. Looking ahead, some of the conclusions were unexpected.

A bit of history

It is hardly necessary to clarify that weapons with a kinetic principle of action — from a stone to a cannonball — have totally prevailed throughout almost the entire human history. This situation changed after the invention of high explosives.

However, then hypersonic speeds became available — already the maximum speed of the V-2 almost exactly corresponded to the "borderline" five mach. At the same time, the energy of a kilogram accelerated to Mach 9.8 already corresponded to the TNT equivalent (4,184 megajoules per kilogram). The real "energy" of TNT varies quite a lot depending on the conditions and on average somewhat more.

As a result, the idea of kinetic bombardment was resurrected already in the 1950s. The low accuracy of early ballistic missiles and potential orbital weapons stood in the way of practical implementation.

By the 80s, the circular probable deviation of the "advanced" intercontinental missiles had dropped to less than a hundred meters. This already made it possible to use "conventional" (conventional) equipment in a more meaningful way than terrorist shelling of cities. At the same time, Pershing-2 acquired a controlled combat unit and an official CVO of 30 m. However, the price of the issue in his case was the "deceleration" of the warhead over the target for the sake of using the terrain guidance system ("TURCOM").

Meanwhile, the mainstream direction of development assumed a further increase in accuracy — and at hypersonic speeds. So, the Trident-2 had quite sufficient accuracy to hit ICBM mines — using a standard trajectory with a long flight time. However, with a "fast" impact from a short distance (along a flat trajectory), the dispersion turned out to be too large. As a result, the development of a guided combat unit for a new naval missile began almost simultaneously with the official launch of the Trident-2 program.

The prospects were obvious.

A quick global strike: from early trials to the "Dark Eagle"

The first experiments in the conventional field date back to the mid-90s. I will quote the report of the US Congressional Research Service from 2021.

"In August 1995, the US Air Force launched an ICBM armed with a "pointed" front (and without an explosive warhead), on a granite (?) slab, which in its characteristics resembled reinforced concrete."

Theoretical calculations about strategic non-nuclear forces began to appear in the open American literature a year later. In 2003, the concept of "Rapid Global Strike" (BSU) became official and public.

At the same time, even before this happened, the Americans "activated" the theme of increasing the accuracy of ballistic missiles, slowed down by the collapse of the USSR.

In 2002, the Pentagon requested funding for Enhanced Effectiveness (E2). As part of the "modest" program to extend the life of the Trident W76 warheads, it was supposed to upgrade them to guided warheads. Against the background of the reduction of nuclear arsenals, this attempt to bring Moscow to a non-negotiable state was considered inappropriate.

This, however, did not prevent the tests from being carried out in March 2005. The second iteration (in 2006) was the proposal, in fact, of the same already within the framework of the "Rapid Global Strike" program. It was about creating a "conventional Trident" with a non-nuclear warhead. The circular probable deviation already achieved in the E2 tests should have been thirty feet (9 m). This proposal was considered as an option with low technical risk.

For notable details, you can refer to the report of the Congressional Research Service already cited above.

"The Navy was considering two types of warheads for the program... One warhead is designed to destroy or disable ground targets such as airfields or buildings using a warhead packed with tungsten rods, known as flechettes, which will fall on the target and destroy everything in an area of up to 3,000 square feet. The other one may be able to destroy protected targets, such as underground bunkers or fortified structures, if it is accurate enough to strike very close to the target."

Remarkable parallels. Anyway, in the 2010s, the Pentagon abandoned risky alterations of nuclear "ballistics" and took the path of creating specialized missiles. So far, the intermediate result of the American efforts is the LRHW system/"Dark Eagle", which is a medium—range missile - a kind of "Pershing-3".

As for Russia, the official statement about the possibility of a symmetrical response to American developments dates back to 2012. The then commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Sergei Karakaev:

"... the presence of a powerful liquid-fueled ICBM in the Strategic Missile Forces will also make it possible to realize such opportunities as the creation of strategic high-precision weapons with non-nuclear equipment and almost global reach, if the United States does not abandon its program to create such missile systems."

How it works

"Hazel" provoked a long series of disputes about how exactly the hypersonic drummer interacts with the target. At the same time, network experts in hypersound managed to doubt the "temperature of the Sun" mentioned by Putin and put forward a number of their own creative theories. The most common: "the warhead will leave only a neat hole with almost no collateral damage."

Meanwhile, the number of scientific papers devoted to the effects of a high—speed impact is measured in literally hundreds - they were dealt with in a variety of contexts. Let's try to draw conclusions from them.

The most obvious and in many ways the key one: the intensity of braking of the "drummer" (and therefore heating and generating a shock wave) both in the air and in the ground will strongly depend on its specific parameters. That allows you to purposefully achieve the desired effects. As a result, specific ammunition will give them a very wide range. This allows us to talk only about the most general principles.

1. Any body moving at supersonic speed in the air generates a shock wave. 3 km / s of "Hazel" is more than half the speed of the shock wave during the explosion of TNT — 7.1 km / s (we are talking about the speed of the wave in the air, not the speed of detonation of the charge). In this case, the pressure at the wave front is proportional to the square of the velocity. However, even with these reservations, the shock wave that occurs when the Hazel blocks move will be more than dangerous.

2. It is no less natural that a body moving at hypersonic speeds experiences extreme heating. The ten-mach warhead of a ballistic missile heats up in the atmosphere to a temperature of about 4000 degrees. At the same time, we are not talking about the "theoretical" braking temperature, but about real indicators, taking into account heat entrainment by air flow, etc.

Formally, 4000 degrees are comparable to the temperature in the center of a classic TNT explosion (about 3000 degrees). However, during an explosion, we are talking about millisecond states and the incendiary effect of TNT is very limited. A red-hot warhead is obviously more effective.

Meanwhile, 4000 degrees is higher than the melting point of the most refractory of metals, tungsten (3422 degrees), and much higher than the boiling/evaporation temperature of iron (2861 degrees).

Similarly, temperature effects will inevitably amplify the shock wave.

3. When hitting the ground / target, the intensity of braking and energy release increases by many orders of magnitude.

4. The efficiency of energy "transfer" is growing no less sharply. It is well known how much more effective an explosion in water "works" compared to an explosion in the air. The reason is the very high density compared to air and the weak compressibility of water. The characteristics of soil and building materials vary very widely. However, on average, soil is much denser than water with comparable compressibility. It is noteworthy that the explosion model in an ideal (incompressible) liquid has been used for a long time and quite successfully in relation to explosions in it.

As a result, the buried (camouflage) explosion of classical ammunition turns buildings into ruins many times more effective than the surface one.

These features were used, for example, by the line of "seismic" bombs of the Second World War — "Tallboy", "Grand Slam" and their American clones; plus, as an extreme option, the twenty-ton post-war "Cloudmaker" T-12.

In the case of a kinetic warhead, the problem of deepening is basically not worth it. As a result, we will get the classic effect of a "seismic" bomb.

5. At the same time, the encounter of a powerful shock wave with a not too durable target material (for example, of the "ground" type) will inevitably generate a completely "tangible" funnel and concomitant destruction on the surface. Although, I repeat, the specific parameters will strongly depend on the "drummer".

6. "Ordinary" camouflage explosions can also create the so-called "gallows hatch effect", when a structure or part of it simply collapses into the resulting cavity.

With sufficient heating during a hypersonic strike, a kinetic explosion also occurs — partial or complete evaporation of the substance of the "impactor" and the target. At speeds of the order of 3 km / s, it will have very far from "meteoric" scales, but to one degree or another it is almost inevitable. Let me remind you that even concrete contains the same water.

In general, it is a very unpleasant weapon — even if we take into account its low vulnerability and extreme high cost of protection.

Combined strategic forces — what it's for.

Let's deal with application issues. Actually, the CVO value below 100 meters already allows the use of conventional warheads against "soft" strategic targets — such as submarines in bases and strategic aviation at airfields. Naturally, the best option for this will not be a land mine and not a kinetic "scrap", but a conditional "hypersonic shrapnel".

The latter, as it is easy to see, will have an extremely unpleasant combination of properties. On the one hand, the ability to "hack" any typical shelter. On the other hand, there are "pyrotechnic" effects that automatically cause detonation of everything at least minimally explosive.

Bringing the CVO to the first meters, in turn, means that ICBM mines, control bunkers, etc. become vulnerable to conventional equipment.

In other words, the answer to the question of why Americans need variations on the theme of a "quick global strike" is extremely simple. First and foremost, for the same disarming and decapitating strike against the enemy's nuclear forces.

The prospects here are obvious. First of all, a controlled warhead without a nuclear charge is trite cheaper than a controlled atomic analogue. Further, nuclear-equipped missiles in this context have only the functions of deterring the enemy in peacetime and forcing surrender after a disarming strike. High accuracy and complexity are not needed for either.

In other words, at the exit you can get an optimized arsenal of strategic weapons. Meanwhile, the very implementation of a disarming strike ultimately rests on resources. There should be a lot of counter-force weapons that are in constant readiness for a strike.

Finally, the non-nuclear option makes it possible to circumvent contractual restrictions on the number of warheads (however, treaties are being revised) and causes fewer political complications in general.

For Russia, these options are quite useless simply because of the unrealistic nature of a disarming strike against an opponent. We didn't even have the theoretical opportunity to quickly sink US strategic submarines and we don't have it. However, from the point of view of the Americans with their maritime dominance, the situation looks fundamentally different.

...And "tactics"

The above does not mean that "kinetics" cannot be used for less global purposes. The nuance is that long—range ballistic missiles themselves are expensive, but not super-expensive weapons. So, the Trident costs about $ 50 million — cheaper than the F-35. Naturally, in the variant with high-precision conventional equipment, the cost of the rocket will increase very significantly.

However, at the same time, the rocket does not require the cost of training and maintaining pilot qualifications, etc. Meanwhile, according to the American Accounting Chamber, the cost of maintaining the F-35 throughout their life cycle may exceed the cost of purchasing the actual aircraft by 3.6 times. In other words, it is very far from the fact that an "advanced" missile will at least catch up with a fighter in terms of life cycle costs.

Meanwhile, the range of non-strategic targets, which is quite reasonable to exchange for the equivalent of losing one fighter without a pilot, is even more extensive than it seems at first glance. Airfields have already been mentioned, and any large ships in the port are equally obvious. However, there are much more counter-intuitive options.

So, even before the SMO began, the price of a 155-mm projectile was $ 2 thousand. In other words, 50 thousand shells cost 100 million. Meanwhile, the same "Hazel" carries at least six warheads with individual guidance. In other words, an "average" ammunition depot turns out to be quite a suitable target — even without taking into account the cost of the damage they can cause, which is necessary in such cases.

In the "civilian" sphere, the same fuel and energy complex looks like an almost ideal goal.

At the same time, if a disarming strike remains a pure theory for Russia, then in non-strategic hypersonic, on the contrary, it is interested in times stronger than the United States. Simply due to the fact that there are no air bases almost anywhere in the world.

The problem lies only in resources — obviously (and reasonably), the nuclear option will remain an alternative priority.