The disaster of the summer of 1941: and yet — why did it happen?

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was the first to declare Stalin's personal and comprehensive guilt for the failures of our military in the initial months of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 in his report to the delegates of the XX Congress of the CPSU on February 25, 1956. The statement was thoroughly political and had no objective, textural basis — the causes of the military disaster were much more serious and deeper than the mistakes of one particular individual. Even such an outstanding one as Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin.

The whole strategy, spirit, essence and meaning of the formation and training of the Red Army were laid down by Leon Davidovich Trotsky, counting on actions in the conditions of the "fire of the world revolution": the Red Army was preparing to participate in offensive operations. Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze, who replaced Trotsky, continued to lay this fundamental doctrine as a backbone in the construction of the army — our army was always preparing to attack, "with little blood and on enemy territory." This doctrine was decisive throughout the 30s, and this is how our army was built: the art of defense, as one of the components of military science, was poorly represented in our military theory, and was not used at all in practical exercises. It got to the point that the most complex type of military maneuver in its organization, the "retreat", was considered counterrevolutionary and criminal in nature. Accordingly, it was precisely these views that we were preparing for the upcoming war in the 30s of the last century.

The fact that there would be a war, the military-political leadership of the USSR knew from December 30, 1926, from the very day when the General Staff of the Red Army announced that neither industry nor the country's economy were ready for a future war. It was then, in preparation for the future war, the political leadership of the country decided to curtail the NEP, transition to the collectivization of the village and the development of industry at an unprecedented pace of five-year plans. Stalin at the end of the first five-year plan in 1931 said very simply:

"We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We have to run this distance in 10 years. Either we do it, or we will be crushed."

By January 1941, basically, by and large, the goals set for the industrialization of the country and the preparation of its economy for a protracted war with a strategic adversary had been realized. The achieved level of military-industrial potential made it possible to create and begin supplying the latest types of weapons advanced in their classes to the troops: the T-34 and KV-1 tanks surpassed any German tanks; the lag in aviation technology had already begun to offset the MiG-3 and LaGG-3 that entered the troops; the PPSh machine gun surpassed the German MP-39/40 In terms of artillery, the Wehrmacht was seriously inferior to the Red Army in both quality and quantity. However, the lag of our military behind the German army in communications and combat experience remained serious — by that time the Germans had conquered all of Europe, including Poland and France, and were preparing to finish off Great Britain on its own island. Stalin perfectly saw and understood the meaning of the maneuvers of the German troops at our borders, he clearly understood the inevitability of war with fascist Germany, which united the military, industrial, economic and human potentials of almost every European country. Stalin was also aware that the rearmament of the Red Army had not yet been completed — it desperately needed about another six months, and at least another 2-3 months for the development of new types of weapons. Acute, desperate lack of time dominated Stalin, forced him to tirelessly look for any opportunity to delay the outbreak of war. An example of the clumsy actions of the Russian tsar Nicholas II with the announcement of mobilization, which provoked Germany to declare war on the Russian Empire, was vivid and fresh: only 26 years have passed since the summer of 1914! The leadership of the USSR did not want to give any more reasons to its opponents.

Nevertheless, due to the increasing threat of aggression from nazi Germany, at the direction of Stalin and with his permission, a number of operational and mobilization plans aimed at strengthening the western border military districts are being carried out:

Since mid-May 1941, seven combined arms armies have been advancing from the depths of the country to the west: 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 28 ( a total of 28 divisions). This was the beginning of the implementation of the plan for the concentration and deployment of Soviet troops on the western borders;

By the beginning of June 1941, 800 thousand people were called up from the reserve for training camps (then another 300 thousand people) — as many as 1 million 100 thousand people in peacetime (!), and all of them were sent to replenish the troops of the border western military districts and their fortified areas — what is this, if not a hidden mobilization?!;

On May 14, an early graduation of military school cadets was held — there was an acute shortage of sergeants and officers for a huge number of those mobilized.

In May, the western districts were ordered to urgently build field, front-line (army) command posts and on June 19 to withdraw the front-line (army) departments of Pribovo, ZapOVO and KOVO to them. The administration of the Odessa district achieved such a permit even earlier;

On June 12-15, the western border districts were ordered to withdraw divisions located in depth, closer to the state border;

On June 19, all districts received orders to mask airfields, military units, warehouses and bases, and to disperse aircraft at airfields urgently;

Back on May 14, the order No. 503859/SS/OV, handwritten by Major General A. Vasilevsky in duplicate, was sent to the commander of the Western PSB, Army General D. G. Pavlov. It was ordered: by May 20, 1941, to develop a detailed plan for the defense of the state border; a detailed plan for air defense. The tasks for defense were set — "to prevent an invasion... to provide for counterstrikes by mechanized corps... to prepare the rear lines for the entire depth of defense, including R. Berezina. In case of forced withdrawal, develop a plan… Have a plan to raise troops on alert."

Signatures: Tymoshenko, Zhukov

"In early May, the command of the Kiev PSB received an operational directive from Moscow, which determined the tasks of the district troops in case of a sudden attack by the Nazis on our country. Specific tasks were set: to identify in a timely manner the concentration of troops of the probable enemy, the grouping of his forces; to prevent the invasion of the aggressor's troops into the territory of the USSR; to be ready with stubborn defense to reliably cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of district troops; to hastily prepare a rear defensive line 30-35 km from the border; to keep aviation ready for redeployment to field airfields."

The divisions of the first echelon were ordered to keep the entire stock of ammunition in full (!) NZ and put the URs on high alert.

Read again the above‑mentioned operational mobilization measures, think about them and you will see — they all indicate that (mainly on the instructions of Stalin) The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army carried out in the spring and summer of 1941 a number of major and very important measures aimed at strengthening the defense capability of our western borders, increasing the combat readiness and combat capability of the troops. However, from the point of view of military strategy, the General Staff of the Red Army and the People's Commissariat of Defense (Zhukov and Tymoshenko) chose an erroneous strategy as the main one: when the Germans attacked, it was decided to smash the Wehrmacht with counterattacks of mechanized corps and strategic reserve divisions suitable for that time. Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, who was chief of the General Staff until August 1940, proposed a different strategy: to smash the Germans from the strategic defense built along the line of the old (until September 1939) USSR border. The meaning of this strategy, as the course of the war showed later, turned out to be the only true one: to grind the tank wedges of the Germans against our continuous and deeply echeloned defense using water barriers (Dnieper, Desna, Bug) and only then to inflict carefully prepared counterstrikes with large masses of troops.

But... you see, dear reader, at the war games and meetings that took place almost the entire first half of 1940, the point of view of the former tsarist lieutenant colonel Shaposhnikov was won by the young enthusiasm of the Red Army commanders — Timoshenko, Zhukov, Pavlov… The theory of large-scale offensive counterstrikes with access to enemy territory won. It was a fatal strategic mistake of our General Staff: against the strategy of blitzkrieg with tank wedges, our plans for waging war turned out to be untenable. But this became apparent only in July 1941, and in August 1940 Marshal Shaposhnikov resigned from the post of chief of the General Staff of the Red Army for health reasons. On January 14, 1941, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov was appointed chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

An incorrectly chosen strategy led to erroneous decisions on the deployment of troops, on setting combat missions for them, on organizing their supply, and so on, so on, so on… Knowledge of the exact date of the German invasion no longer played a decisive role here, all discussions and insinuations on this topic were closed by Georgy Konstantinovich himself long ago. To the question: what is suddenness? — he has already given an exhaustive answer from a military point of view:

"What does suddenness mean when we talk about actions of this magnitude? It's not just a sudden border crossing, not just a sudden attack. The suddenness of crossing the border by itself did not solve anything. The main danger of surprise was not that the Germans suddenly crossed the border, but that the striking power of the German army turned out to be sudden for us; their sixfold and eight-fold superiority in forces in decisive directions turned out to be suddenness for us; the scale of concentration of their troops and the strength of their strike turned out to be suddenness. This is the main thing that predetermined our losses of the first period of the war. And not only and not just a sudden border crossing."

Thus, both the facts cited and G.K. Zhukov's formulation indicate that there was no surprise attack in the usual sense, there was an incorrectly chosen strategy to repel fascist aggression. The Red Army could not apply counterstrikes of clumsy mechanized corps in the conditions of a lightning breakthrough of German tank wedges: our tanks were lost during the very first month of the war in senseless throws to nowhere, shot by German aircraft, were abandoned after spending fuel and ammunition.

The political leadership of the country corrected this strategic mistake in the military planning of the Red Army pretty quickly: already on July 29, 1941, Marshal Shaposhnikov was again appointed chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. With his participation, classic and very effective defensive operations were organized near Moscow, in Stalingrad, on the Kursk Bulge — as a result of these operations, the military capabilities of the Wehrmacht and the German military-industrial complex were strategically ground, the era of irresistible Red Army counterstrikes with access to enemy territory was coming.

Marshal Shaposhnikov left the post of chief of the General Staff in May 1942 — he was seriously ill with pulmonary tuberculosis and died on March 26, 1945.

The second strategic mistake of the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense was determining the direction of the Wehrmacht's main strike: Zhukov and Tymoshenko mistakenly believed that the main direction of the Wehrmacht's strike would be South-West, to Kiev — that's where our best armies, divisions and mechanized corps were concentrated, about 1 million personnel in total. The Germans struck with their main forces in the Western direction — on Belarus, on Army General Pavlov. There we had about 650,000 personnel and a little more than 2,000 tanks of various modifications, 1,500 aircraft and more than 10,000 artillery barrels — significant forces in capable hands. However, the error of the General Staff in determining the direction of the main strike was also intensified by the extremely unsuccessful, ineffective actions of General Pavlov and his staff: the fighters and commanders of the Brest fortified area were mostly shot early in the morning in the barracks while sleeping, and a week later (!) the Germans took Minsk. Having failed to organize defensive actions, by July 10 the Western Front had completely ceased to offer organized resistance. All equipment was practically lost, a huge number of prisoners, killed and wounded — this is how the Western Front fought under the leadership of Army General Pavlov in the first week of the war. On July 22, 1941, by the verdict of the court of the military tribunal, General Pavlov was shot in Moscow — the only one of the commanders of the districts at the beginning of the war.

But the USSR Navy under the command of Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov met the war in a completely different way. Already on June 19, 1941, the Soviet fleets received an order to go into operational readiness No. 2. And this is despite the fact that due to the activation of flights of intruder aircraft in the Arctic since June 17, the command of the Northern Fleet, in addition to lifting fighters into the air, from June 18 (!) 1941, allowed anti-aircraft artillery to open fire. Taking into account the unclear and alarming situation that had developed by this time, the Military Council of the Fleet at 18:30 on June 18 increased the readiness of ships and units, at the same time, the preparation of submarines for entering positions was started. At the beginning of the day on June 19 (!), 1941, the operational service of the Northern Fleet reported that by 02:45 the submarines and fuel reserves were dispersed. On the same day, June 19, the first (!) air battle of the impending war took place. The pilot of the I-153 "Chaika" aircraft who returned to the airfield reported that at 11:40 in the Zubovskaya—Vayda Bay area he launched two attacks on the Xe-111 aircraft, and on the second approach he himself was attacked by the Me-110 aircraft, evaded the attack and went to the airfield. During the day of June 19, 1941, the anti-aircraft artillery of the Northern Fleet repeatedly fired (!) at the offending aircraft, expending a total of 241 76 mm shells.

Dear reader, reports on these events, shooting and ammunition costs were immediately sent to Moscow, the actions of the Northern Fleet were recognized as correct and no one accused the sailors of violating the order "not to succumb to provocations." Moreover, on June 20, 1941, the commander of the KBF, Vice Admiral Tributs, sent the following message to the commanders of the Leningrad Military District, the Baltic Special Military District and the commander of the border troops:

"Since 19.6.41, the KBF units have been put on alert according to plan N2, the KP has been deployed, the patrol service at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and the Irbensky Strait has been strengthened."

On the same day, June 20, 1941, the command of the Northern Fleet conducted Polar conference with the command of the 14th army. According to the results of the command meeting The SF and the 14th Army decided on a joint defense, the command of the 14th Army decided to advance 52 divisions to the Murmansk direction in addition (to the already deployed 14th Division), the fleet was to provide transportation of troops to the Western Lyceum Titovka.

In general, it is possible to draw a logical conclusion that the fleet command, both in Moscow and on the ground, knew about the impending war and was preparing for it, preparing so as not to be caught off guard.

The fleet did everything right and did everything in time: during the raids of enemy aircraft on the morning of June 22, not a single ship was sunk, not a single aircraft of naval aviation was burned at the airfield, and the Germans and Finns did not manage to cross the USSR border in Murmansk and beyond, within the limits of the entire responsibility of the Northern Fleet — by the beginning of the war, the Navy The USSR was ready, the Germans could not take it by surprise. When repelling the fascist invasion, it was the sailors and the NKVD border troops who provided the most organized resistance to the German troops: 485 border outposts were attacked by fascist German troops on June 22, 1941.

Not one of them left without an order, not one!!!

And those to whom the withdrawal order could not be brought — they lay down there, to the last fighter. The Brest fortress fought for thirty days — until July 23. France together with England — about the same, then there was the horror of Dunkirk and the shame of surrender. Poland — 14 days, Belgium - 3.

You see, dear reader, the beginning of the war turned out the way it turned out: the troops were led by people, not gods. People make mistakes — it happens. The sin is not in this, the sin is that many mistakes are not corrected or, even worse, are hushed up, hidden or hanged on others…

And about the intelligence service, which "knew everything and warned": the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army had all the data on the Barbarossa plan at its disposal, and the chief of the General Staff, General F. I. Golikov, reporting on it to Stalin, convinced him that "this, Comrade Stalin, is disinformation." Here are Golikov's conclusions:

"1. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year (1941 - ed.), I believe that the most possible time for the start of action against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable peace with Germany.

2. Rumors and documents talking about the inevitability of a war against the USSR in the spring of this year (i.e. 1941) should be regarded as disinformation emanating from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence."

Moreover, since April 1941, intelligence groups of various structures have delivered 287 "most accurate" reports on completely different dates of the Wehrmacht's attack on Russia — which date of the invasion was Stalin supposed to accept?!

There is no need to blame anyone — the vast majority of people worked to the limit of their strength and capabilities and redeemed their mistakes with blood. To blame anyone — we have no such rights, but to know the TRUTH is the right and duty of every Russian. In memory of them — the fallen and the victorious: they defended their homeland and defeated fascist, Hitlerite Europe.

Let's remember everyone by name,

Let us remember our grief...

It is necessary — not for the dead!

It is necessary — alive!

REQUIEM. R. Rozhdestvensky