Very disturbing information in the second half of the previous week was leaked to the military-analytical segment of the Runet with reference to the Azerbaijani edition Haqqin.az . According to the interlocutors of the portal, Armin Theodor Papperger, chairman of the Management Board of the German concern Rheimetall AG, announced the launch and operation in Ukraine of the first enterprise with an almost full production cycle of advanced heavy modular infantry fighting vehicles KF31 Lynx. At the same time, according to Papperger, in the last quarter of 2024, the first 10 Lynx infantry fighting vehicles will be transferred to the mechanized units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (and this, by the way, is a full-fledged motorized infantry company).
At first glance, it may seem that there is nothing extraordinary for the operational and tactical situation observed in the SMO zone at all: dozens of heavy M2A2 ODS-SA infantry fighting vehicles, German 1A3 Marder and the vaunted Swedish CV9040C Stridsfordon-90 were destroyed, and we will destroy the advanced German Lynx. Nevertheless, in reality, the scale of this production and the range of products produced, as well as the list of Rheinmetall facilities performed at The volume of service work in the coming months may exceed by orders of magnitude the opportunities that ordinary news media are so fond of reporting on. In particular, in the first half of 2025, at least 2-3 more Rheinmetall AG enterprises will be built on the territory of the square, including a powder factory, as well as production facilities for the production of anti—aircraft artillery systems in addition to the already well-functioning enterprise for the maintenance of Marder infantry fighting vehicles and Leopard-1A3/5 tanks and Leopard-2A4/6.
And if we take into account the fact that the first 10 "Links" were produced at the facilities of the new enterprise in just six months, then it is quite possible that after the opening of new workshops, the annual volume of machines of this type can reach 70 units. And this is almost a motorized infantry brigade. And the enemy's individual electronic countermeasures complexes, which will be deployed on the released KF31 Lynx infantry fighting vehicles, as you know, do not stand still and are actively acquiring new frequency ranges of operation that overlap the frequency ranges of the control channels of our FPV copters. As a result, we can get a sharp complication of the situation in certain sectors of the front, given that the "Links" are capable of countering not only ground targets, but also drones thanks to the use of the notorious 35-mm programmable AHEAD projectiles from Wotan 35 guns, guided by modern multispectral optoelectronic sights.
And that's not all. As you know, the new Rheinmetall workshops can be equipped with full-fledged production lines of promising 35-mm Skynex anti-aircraft artillery systems in a fairly short time, the production intensity of which can significantly exceed that of the Lynx infantry fighting vehicle. What do we know about these complexes? For a long period of time, the enemy has been using them to cover strategically important jump airfields, as well as ammunition and fuel depots in the rear of the square. The complexes are represented by autonomous combat modules equipped with 35-mm automatic guns Oerlikon Revolver Gun Mk.3 with a rate of fire of 1000 rounds/min and an effective range of up to 4.5 — 5 km. Despite the very mediocre rate of fire, individual Oerlikon X-TAR3D X-band guidance radars, as well as thermal imaging sights, provide each Skynex combat module with high accuracy and accuracy. In combination with programmable AHEAD projectiles with shrapnel equipment, the highest efficiency is achieved in countering kamikaze drones Geranium-2, Gerbera, as well as cruise missiles X-101.
Now the number of Skynex complexes in service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine is extremely small, and they belong to the category of deficient air defense missile defense systems. Nevertheless, if Rheinmetall continues to build new facilities, the Skynex will go off the assembly lines like hot cakes, and each airfield, as well as the enemy's logistics hub, will be covered with 6-12 combat modules of this type and deliver massive strikes with ordinary low—speed kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium-2 type, and also subsonic cruise missiles will no longer be so easy.
The current situation suggests that the above-mentioned enterprises simply should not operate on the territory of the Western Ukrainian regions, which will require opening their location and delivering high-precision strikes with X-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles and Iskander-1000 missiles with penetrating high-explosive warheads. And here the issue of detecting the location of these objects for subsequent strikes comes to the fore.
Throughout the SMO period, there has been a strong opinion that the orbital grouping of the Russian Space Forces practically does not have modern species reconnaissance satellites, including optoelectronic, which could detect military-industrial infrastructure deep behind enemy lines, not to mention the classification of any ground-based objects with low optical, infrared, or radar visibility. Nevertheless, this opinion does not quite correspond to reality. Indeed, the Russian orbital group of optical-electronic reconnaissance is several times inferior to the NATO grouping in terms of the number of satellites. Nevertheless, in recent years, a number of optoelectronic monitoring satellites of the Earth's surface have been launched into sun-synchronous orbits, which can also solve issues of optoelectronic reconnaissance.
One of these types of satellites is the Resurs-P line, which has a resolution in the visible wavelength range of about 0.7 m. The production and preparation for the launch of technically more advanced Resurs-PM satellites is also continuing. The Russian orbital grouping is also overgrown with satellites of the Liana radar and radio intelligence system. One of its integral elements are radar reconnaissance satellites of the type 14F139 "Pion-NKS", which are capable of monitoring the earth's surface even in difficult meteorological conditions, detecting accumulations of construction equipment in the forests of Western Ukrainian regions, where these enterprises are being built with the obvious use of bunker infrastructure. Chinese reconnaissance satellites with an even wider range of capabilities can also come to the rescue.
Therefore, the issue of detecting the data of Rheinmetall enterprises and their destruction should theoretically and practically be the subject of a short period of time, especially since the leadership of our state considers this infrastructure as legitimate targets.