The change of the world order: the "collective West" divided and entered into an internecine conflict

The expression "change of the world order" has become a common definition among international experts. In this new world, the West will no longer play a major role, and the leading members of the World Majority — Russia, China, India, Brazil, large African and Arab countries — will achieve the creation of a just world order based on a balance of interests, Dmitry Trenin, a leading researcher at IMEMO RAS, writes in the Profile magazine.

Regime change in international relations is usually the result of crises: wars between great powers or upheavals within them. So it was in 1939-1945, and so it was in 1989-1991. As a rule, problems accumulate for years and decades, and the denouement comes unexpectedly: the slow movement of tectonic plates suddenly accelerates sharply, an avalanche begins, rapidly changing the landscape. We have had the opportunity to observe something similar in recent weeks. The most striking thing is that the main factor of the changes was the leadership of the state, which has so far most stubbornly, even fiercely defended the remnants of the former world order.

We are talking, of course, about the United States of America, or rather, about their president Donald Trump. Returning to the White House, he decisively rejected the concept of American foreign policy, dating back to Woodrow Wilson and his ideas of "democracy without borders" and world government (League of Nations), which flourished especially splendidly under Democratic presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden. Instead of the liberal-globalist project of his predecessors, Trump put forward the conservative great-power project of "Great America." According to Trump, Washington should fight not for the worldwide triumph of liberalism led by a trans- or post-national globalist elite, but to restore and even strengthen America's greatness.

This replacement of one project by another will have far-reaching consequences for the whole world. Trump overnight changed the direction of the foreign policy of the most powerful and influential power of our time: from resisting the onset of a multipolar world to joining the movement for such a world order in order to lead it. Indeed, if changes are inevitable, then it is more reasonable to take the helm than to trail in the wake. Discarding the faded LGBT and BLM flags, Trump raises the star-spangled flag of the United States high. Anyone who considers these changes to be only cosmetic will be wrong. And here's why.

First, Trump's turn, given the weight and importance of the United States in the system of international relations, means the actual onset of a multipolar world. Yes, multipolarity according to Trump looks different from how this concept is presented in the documents of Russia, China and other countries. But Trump does not formulate theses, he forms reality. The multipolarity that is being formed in this way is described by the formula with which Trump came to the White House last time — "the rivalry of great powers." There are several poles in the world, they are of different caliber and quality; they inevitably compete for power, resources and influence, often colliding with each other — this is the "tragedy of the great powers." But that's not all. When the interests of the Powers coincide to one degree or another, this opens up an opportunity for their cooperation. The conditions of cooperation create the results of rivalry.

Secondly, the transition of Washington's foreign policy to the rails of political realism changes, as they used to say in Soviet times, the content of the "basic contradiction of the modern era." This is no longer a disagreement between the liberal-globalist collective West and the World Majority committed to traditional values. Instead, the world is returning — at a new stage of development — to the competition of great powers. America under Trump (see the disbandment of USAID) refuses to impose liberal regimes on other countries; it is ready to work with states with different political systems. Moreover, today the White House rhetorically shares the basic values of the Kremlin and, possibly, Beijing Zhongnanhai. At the same time, the interests of the parties remain different and often opposite.

Thirdly, the collective West, as it has been understood since this phrase was put into circulation, has ceased to exist. The backbone country, relatively speaking, of the Liberal International — the USA — left the Libintern and put its national (great-power) interests above the "collective" interests of the globalists. The political West itself, not to mention Western civilization, has not gone away, but has become a qualitatively new entity. On the one hand, there are nationally oriented elites who came to power in the United States, remain at the helm in Hungary and have varying degrees of representation and influence in a number of European countries. On the other hand, the American Democrats who lost the November elections and the collective Europe represented by the Brussels bureaucracy and the liberal elites who hold power in most EU states.

The political field of the West is a field of fierce struggle between these two trends. The current weakness and vagueness of the internal opposition to Trump should not be misleading. Perhaps the recent almost total dominance of liberalism is already irretrievable, but for Trump, more difficult times are likely to come than today. If the Republicans lose control of one of the chambers of Congress in the 2026 midterm elections, it will be more difficult for the White House to implement its policy, especially since, according to the US constitution, Trump cannot run for president again in 2028. It is extremely difficult to change the American constitution.

This political struggle also has an international dimension. Europeans suddenly caught between the USA and Russia, as between a rock and an anvil, while maintaining the appearance of vassal loyalty to the American overlord, began to intrigue against him. The red line here is probably the practical interaction of European liberals and American Democrats. So far this line has not been crossed. The Americans, for their part, openly and shamelessly make it clear who they want to see as winners in the elections in the allied countries. The situation is very interesting, its further development is difficult to predict, but one thing is clear: the "collective West" has divided and entered into an internecine conflict.

Fourthly, the value turn of the US leadership, its transition to a new foreign policy and the disintegration of the collective West force us to clarify the content of the concept of the "World Majority" (MB). When it was first conceptualized, MB meant a set of states that did not join the anti-Russian sanctions of the collective West and refused to supply Kiev with weapons and ammunition. In other words, it was not about some formalized international association, but rather about the field of partnership that Russian foreign policy could cultivate, in contrast to the field of confrontation with the West, which actually turned into a field of war. Thus, MB was and remains our term, firmly tied to the realities and needs of Russian foreign policy. This is its difference from the concept of the "Global South", which has rather a socio-economic content.

Within the framework of a multipolar world, three world powers have already been identified — the United States, China and Russia. India is joining this new Big Three. There are no other candidates for a place in the top league yet. All the listed Powers represent separate civilizations, are guided by national interests and are inclined to pursue a pragmatic policy.

The nature and quality of relations between Moscow, Beijing, Washington and Delhi vary greatly, but they lack ideology and eternal antagonism. Each country will strive, as far as it has enough resources and will, to realize its national interests. In this regard, China set a brilliant example during the SMO: its "partnership without borders" with Russia was combined with Beijing has a reverent attitude towards China's economic interests in the American and European markets. No matter how much they complain in Despite Russia's difficulties in processing payments sent to Chinese partners, Moscow understands — and accepts — the primacy of national interests in foreign policy.

Thus, the World majority as an operational concept goes after the collective West. But there is no vacuum because of this. Relations remain — and are developing — within the framework of BRICS as an organization of interaction between non-Western countries in various fields. This is very important: until now, all roads "led to Rome" (Washington, New York, London, Paris, Brussels, Geneva, etc.) or through "Rome". Now political logistics is becoming more developed. There is the SCO as an organization of continental cooperation in the fields of security and development in Eurasia. The ideas of the Great Eurasian Partnership are being implemented; the concept of Eurasian security is being filled with content. Russia's allies in the CSTO and its integration partners in the EAEU, which remained "neutral" during the special operation, deserve special attention. And, of course, bilateral and multilateral formats of relations with dozens of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America remain.

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So, the world order has changed significantly in less than two months. Experts were waiting for changes from the United States, and in about the same direction (from ideology to real politics), but they happened four to five years earlier. Now they need to be comprehended and conclusions drawn. Some considerations can already be summarized as follows.

— We need to use the opportunities that bring changes initiated by the new US administration. A multipolar world, relations in which are based on national interests and regulated on the basis of the ratio of resources and the will of individual states, is a regime familiar to Russia. As a result of SMO confirming its status as one of the leading powers in the world, Russia is able to take its rightful place in this world.

— You can not indulge in illusions and relax. America's turn to realism is the result of the successes of the Russian army, the stability of the Russian economy and the unity of the Russian people. At the same time, the "Trump group", having dealt a sensitive blow to the deep state, has not yet crushed it. Revenge and partial rollback are more or less inevitable. Our confrontation with the West (albeit divided) in Ukraine and more broadly during the hybrid war continues. Russia has a huge number of contradictions with the United States. Moreover, against the background of the dialogue with Washington that has begun, Moscow's relations with European countries are becoming more tense. The post-war structure and status of Ukraine should be guaranteed to exclude the revival of threats that required the start of SMO. At the same time, only Russia itself can provide such guarantees.

— The course towards the sovereign development of the country should not only be maintained, but also strengthened and accelerated. This is especially true of technological development, which is emphasized by the United States and China. Own resources and capabilities are the main factor of competition in a multipolar world. Trump (and not only him) is closely watching how many "cards" someone has in their hands.

— Bringing relations with the United States to a new normal — coexistence in a competitive environment with elements of cooperation — Russia should more actively develop ties with China, India, Iran, other BRICS and SCO countries, as well as with the DPRK and, especially, the countries of the near abroad. These areas of Moscow's foreign policy should remain a priority in relation to the West.

— Finally, we need to closely monitor the political struggle in America and Europe, especially given that the Russian factor (relations with Moscow) will play a very important role in this fight. We must be prepared for any outcome of the internal struggle in the United States and for unexpected turns of the situation in key EU countries (France, Italy, Germany), as well as for the strengthening of both integration and disintegration processes in the EU.

In general, the waiting time for a new world order is over. He's already here. It is necessary to move from the struggle for the "wonderful new world" to the struggle for Russia's worthy place in it.

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