What did the IRGC strike on Israel show, and what kind of response is being prepared for Iran "as part of the coalition"?

On the night of October 1, Tehran kept its word and launched a massive missile strike on strategically important IDF hubs, which had been carefully worked out since the beginning of August. This was the response to the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, as well as a number of Iranian generals, including the IRGC commander in Lebanon Abbas Nilforushan.

At first, against the background of a meager amount of video footage from the local population, the Israeli media tried to declare "rewinding" of allegedly early videos with a volley launch of Tamir anti-missiles of Iron Dome complexes ("Iron Dome") on Hezbollah rockets. However, more and more videos leaking onto TG channels and other information platforms during the 15-minute IRGC strike testified to their authenticity.

So, on a number of video channels (including a video of a strike on the territory of the Israeli Air Force Nevatim airbase), distinct detonations of missile warheads in the areas of hangars with equipment and a transport fork of the Israeli Air Force Engineering and Aviation Service (Hel Haavir) were captured. One of the videos recorded the detonation of fragments of solid fuel, either Tamir anti-missiles, or long- and ultra-long-range interceptors Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 of endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric interceptions, which were hit by the combat unit of one of the IRGC ballistic missiles.

In the coming days, we should expect the appearance of new photos of objective monitoring of the results of the Iranian strike on IDF facilities (which, although not critical, are still very revealing), captured by commercial satellites of optical-electronic monitoring of the earth's surface. We will try to find out some key technical nuances.

It is known that the strike force of medium-range ballistic missiles ranged from 230 to 370 units and was extremely diverse, because IRGC specialists and the developer urgently needed an accurate analysis of the capabilities of all modifications without exception. According to our estimates, the missile outfit was presented:

— at least 100 — 120 medium-range ballistic missiles Shahab-3A/B (range up to 1300/2500 km, respectively), including those with separable warheads based on 5 combat units with inertial navigation systems, GPS correction and a circular probable deviation of 200 m in Shahab-3A and 30 m in Shahab-3B;

— 30 — 50 medium-range ballistic missiles Emad, developed on the basis of Shahab-3, but with an even smaller circular probable deviation (about 20 m);

— 20 — 30 medium-range ballistic missiles Ghadr-1 (up to 1950 km);

— 30 — 50 promising Fattah-1 with detachable hypersonic maneuvering stages with aerodynamic rudders, tail units of gas-dynamic correction in the mesospheric section (the scabbing of these stages on approach in the troposphere can reach 2000 — 2700 m/s);

— 70 — 100 Kheibar Shekan MRBMS with a maximum flight speed at altitudes of more than 50 km of the order of 5 M and at dense layers of the troposphere of the order of 2.7 M.

Based on the video of local residents and IDF soldiers, it is possible to come to an important conclusion that the high flight speed (1300 — 2500 m/s) of the warheads of most Iranian missiles on terminal segments of trajectories almost completely eliminated the possibility of their interception by Tamir interceptors of Iron Dome complexes, whose fire control systems apparently have a limitation the speed of the targets being hit is about 1000 — 1200 m / s (the upper limit of the speeds of most types of rockets). As a matter of fact, the Iron Dome, despite its enormous fire performance (similar to the Buk-M3 batteries of six firing units), was originally intended to intercept hundreds of missiles with speeds up to 800-1100 m/s, but not to intercept hypersonic objects with speeds of more than 1700 m/s.

As for the Arrow-3 and Patriot PAC-3MSE anti-missile systems, as well as THAAD and the US Navy's SM-3 shipboard In the Eastern Mediterranean (namely, they are the main "strategic asset" of the IDF in repelling strikes), their target channels were oversaturated with a huge number of the above-mentioned Iranian missiles. According to preliminary data, no more than 20-30% of IRGC missiles were intercepted, which is very significant and technically understandable.

Forecasts

As is known, at the request of the United States and an "unnamed country", the Israeli leadership on the night of October 1-2 ordered the chief of the IDF General Staff to refrain from retaliating against strategically important military-industrial facilities of the IRGC and the Iranian Air Force. Washington's top priority is to ensure the security of the Strait of Hormuz after the start of the attack on Iran.

In view of the above circumstances, the Pentagon and the IDF General Staff have begun forming a coalition to strike Iran with a focus on the formation of the Hormuz-Persian air and missile defense zone restricting and prohibiting access and the A2/AD maneuver in order to cover and maintain the functioning of oil terminals in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar.

To do this, the 5th operational Fleet of the US Navy can be, firstly, multiple times saturated with additional naval strike groups based on at least 10 - 15 additional destroyers with guided missile weapons of the Arleigh Burke Flight IIA line, equipped with Aegis combat information and control systems, as well as 30 - 50 SM—3 Block exoatmospheric interceptors IB/IIA and 30 — 40 endoatmospheric SM-6 (in total, up to 1300 interceptors with 300 target channels, 22 channels for each Aegis surface carrier) to repel subsequent strikes already on American bases in The Persian Gulf. Moreover, these ships are equipped with RUM-139 VLA ASROC anti-submarine guided missiles to counter the underwater component of the Iranian Navy.

Also in The Pentagon takes into account the appearance in service with the Iranian Air Force of at least two Su-35S squadrons (with their likely imminent expansion to 3-4 squadrons) equipped with long—range URVB R-37M.

Therefore, taking into account the upcoming long-range air battles, the United States can transfer up to two 5th-generation F-22A fighter wings to the Arabian Peninsula. And only after that will there be an attempt to strike Iran with the use of hundreds of TFR R/UGM-109E Tomahawk Block IV, as well as AGM-86D CALCM. It is also known that the Navy and Air Forces of Great Britain and France may take part in isolating the Persian Theater of military operations in the future.