A "window" for attacks on the military-industrial complex of Ukraine in the absence of Patriot has been found: what are the first results?

While expert communities continue to speculate about the future actions of the Trump administration, London, Paris and Berlin are in no hurry to form an anti-missile barrier over Kiev. Berlin is focused on replenishing the MIM-104F PAC-3MSE endoatmospheric missile defense ammunition to maintain its own lower echelon of missile defense, as well as on purchasing additional Patriot PAC-3MSE batteries to cover military-industrial complex facilities.

Thales, the Ministry of the Armed Forces, as well as the Air Operations Command and The French air defense is focused on hardware and software modernization of the multifunctional Arabel radar stations in terms of increasing the target tracking potential at speeds of 1100 — 1300 m/s and the ability to issue target designation to Aster-30 Block-1NT anti-aircraft missiles. After all, as you know, it was the multifunctional Arabel radars in conjunction with the earlier version of the Aster-30 missile systems that demonstrated the "episodic" (20-30%) ability to escort our Iskander—M, which led to interceptions only in 15-20% of cases (unlike 40-70% for Patriot PAC-3MSE).

As a result, the Ukrainian Armed Forces cover their strategically important rear facilities only with IRIS-T SLM, IR-ASRAAM short- and medium-range anti-aircraft missile batteries based on AIM-132 anti-aircraft missiles, as well as a wide range of FrankenSAM-type short-range hybrid air defense systems based on the anti-aircraft version of the R-73RMD air-to-air guided missiles-2, as well as RIM-7P anti-aircraft missiles.

The hardware and software component of the IRIS-T SLM complexes, as well as anti—aircraft guided missiles, has speed limits for intercepted targets of no more than 800-1000 m/s. Despite the ability to detect aerodynamic and ballistic targets diving at an angle of 70 degrees with a transition to tracking at an angle of 90 degrees, TRML-4D radars are not able to stably track targets approaching at speeds of 950 — 1100 m/s. As you have already understood, this list of targets also includes operational-tactical quasi-ballistic missiles of the 9M723−1 Iskander-M line.

As a result, the above-mentioned air defense systems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are capable of effectively countering only the 3M14T/K Caliber-PL/NK and X-101 cruise missiles, and even then only when the TRML-4D radars are placed at commanding heights and have a radio horizon of about 20 km. The same feature is characteristic of the 9A310M1 firing units of the Buk-M1 complexes in the FrankenSAM modification. To intercept low-altitude targets, these firing installations must be located at altitudes, which is not often realized by the enemy. That is why our massive strikes with Kalibr-NK and X-101 missiles often bring very good results.

On April 24, a massive strike by 9M723−1 missiles of the Iskander-M complexes on the industrial zone of the Antonov aviation plant fully confirmed our above analysis. A similar confirmation is also true for the strike of Kalibr-NK/PL low-profile cruise missiles on the workshops of the V.A. Malyshev Kharkov Plant of Transport Engineering. Moreover, in the latter case, the Gepard and Skynex anti-aircraft artillery systems covering the strategically important enterprise of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex and the Armed Forces of Ukraine could not intercept even 20% of our "Calibers". At the enterprise, and during these strikes, several workshops for the production of inconspicuous kamikaze UAVs and FPV drones were hit, as well as a critically important repair base for the restoration and modernization of MBT T-64BV, T-72AV/B, Leopard-2A4/5/6, artillery and other enemy equipment.

Meanwhile, against the background of Kim Jong-un's official confirmation of the dispatch of KPA units to the Kursk direction, as well as the equipping of the newest North Korean destroyer Choe Hyon (Choe Hyon) with the Russian 4-channel shipboard anti-aircraft system Pantsir-M, we come to the conclusion that military-technical interaction between Moscow and Pyongyang continues to rapidly escalate. Therefore, already during the May—June military campaign, units of the Russian Missile Forces and Artillery can provide the enemy with a number of very interesting "surprises".

So, in service with one of the rocket artillery divisions of the Missile Forces and artillery of Russia, North Korean 240-mm multiple launch rocket systems M1991 Juche-100 equipped with unguided rockets with a range of 30 and 60 km (220-mm MLRS "Hurricane" — up to 35 km) were recently seen. High-explosive fragmentation, cluster, incendiary, smoke and probably thermobaric warheads have been developed for these missiles. MLRS M1991 will be able to significantly increase the counter-battery potential of the Russian RViA in countering long-range 155-mm self-propelled guns Krab, PzH-2000, etc., having the Vulcano UAS. After all, even despite the rather low accuracy of combat at a distance of 45 + km, the power of the 240-mm NURS is very serious, especially when it comes to cluster warheads with air initiation and an effective fragmentation radius of 50 — 70 m.

And of course, these are modernized operational-tactical quasi-ballistic missiles KN-23, which are an analogue of the Iskander-1000 missile developed in the KBM. Now information about the use of KN-23 on the objects of the Armed Forces of Ukraine appears very rarely. Nevertheless, a couple of episodes were recorded by the enemy. And the most important detail of these episodes was the fact that North Korean KN-23 missiles were loaded into the INS with modern anti-aircraft maneuvering algorithms, which, according to one of the calculations of the Patriot PAC-3MSE air defense missile systems, were able to create enormous difficulties for MIM-104F anti-missiles in interception, despite the fact that they are equipped with nasal gas-dynamic belts specifically for intercepting such complex highly maneuverable ballistic targets.

The most interesting thing is that having a more powerful solid-fuel rocket engine (than the standard version of the Iskander—M), with a target distance of 200 - 250 km from the firing position, the KN-23 rocket can demonstrate an approach speed of 1350 — 1400 m / s, and a marching speed of 2400 m / s.

A similar goal for the Patriot PAC-2 is even more difficult even without performing anti-aircraft maneuvers. Well, the range of the KN-23 of the order of 900 km will make it possible to strike at enemy military-industrial complex facilities and BC warehouses in all regions of Western Ukraine and even in the immediate vicinity of the border with Poland.