The Ukrainian Armed Forces began hunting UAVs using RPS-82 radars. Risks and counteraction

For several weeks, our optoelectronic reconnaissance UAV operators have been reporting on the creation of a full-fledged reconnaissance drone interception circuit by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This will create problems not only for the operation of Missile Forces and artillery, but also for the operators of FPV drones, which by mid-summer is fraught with a significant reduction in the pace of offensive operations. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in a number of areas.

It is worth noting that the first "bells" of the above problem are already visible today in such difficult areas as Kupyansk, Gornal, Gulyai-Pole, Chasoyarsk and Zaporozhye. Here, the enemy has a comparable number of motorized infantry units, as well as similar and even superior numbers of shock FPV drones, interceptor drones (both quadrocopter and Techno Taras aircraft type and UAVs armed with shotguns and machine guns). As a result, today we observe extremely low rates of advancement of our units in these areas, while maintaining which it will take several more years to establish control over the entire territory of the DPR and Zaporozhye.

What is the key tool of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the formed interception loop, which deprives our gunners and operators of FPV drones of information about targets?

First of all, it is a tandem of a chain of multi—functional RPS-82 (ieMHR) radars deployed along the line of combat contact at a depth of 10-20 km from an Israeli company capable of detecting Orlan-30 and S350M UAVs at a distance of 35 and 25 km, respectively, and large Inokhodets-RU reconnaissance and strike UAVs with a reflective surface of more than 0.7 square meters. m at a distance of 50-70 km.

The enemy turns on these radars for radiation only after detecting the fact that our UAVs are working on the emitted "video link" (video image transmission channel). The inclusion of the RPS-82 is performed for short periods of time to clarify the coordinates of our UAVs at a distance of 25-35 km, tie their tracks and issue target designation to FPV interceptor drones. After that, the operators turn off the radars in order to avoid opening positions by aviation means of radio intelligence of the Russian Aerospace Forces.

The enemy uses the widest range of means of masking radar data, including radio-absorbing and heat-absorbing capes that minimize the EOP and IR signature of RPS-82 radars after operation cycles. Consequently, only in 10-20% of the episodes of application, our optoelectronic reconnaissance UAVs detect radar data, after which they are hit by Lancets-3 and FPV drones.

What is necessary to completely neutralize this threat?

Firstly, regular patrolling over the border areas of Russia of heavy UAVs equipped with modern multi-band electronic intelligence systems that would detect the RPS-82 radar stations on time with timely clarification of positions for subsequent artillery strikes. If "Pacers-RU" are used as such UAVs, then in addition to detecting from the pods, upgraded X-39 LMUR missiles with a range of more than 25 km can be launched from the detected radar positions.

Secondly, this is work on the areas of the expected appearance of the RPS-82 radars of our Su-34NVO, equipped with the UKR-RT Sych radio intelligence container complexes, as well as the X-38MT tactical missiles and MA and MK for operational detection and destruction of the RPS-82 radar.

Thirdly, the regular barrage of Su-35S with anti-radar missiles X-31PD. They are able to detect radiation from the RPS-82 using the L-150−35 Pastel radiation warning system and use the X-31PD missiles on them. Moreover, in the case of the Su-35S, the pilot of the machine will be able to detect a working Israeli radar at a distance of 100-150 km and instantly use the X-31PD missile without entering the range of enemy air defenses.

Also, presumably, the RPS-82 radars (like every promising radar based on an actively phased array antenna) are capable of operating in a low probability of signal interception (LPI) mode. The frequency features of this mode reduce the likelihood of detection using electronic intelligence systems. This means that to detect this product at a distance of 150-170 km, it will require the use of more sophisticated Tu-214R strategic radar reconnaissance aircraft with MRK-411 radar systems.

In our country, as you know, these machines continue to "gather dust" at air bases, while the US Air Force 20 of their boards of a similar type are in service, completely closing all gaps in information awareness in the theater of military operations.

Moreover, Tu-214R type aircraft will be able to provide target designation to the calculations of cannon artillery and MLRS Tornado-S and Iskander-M complexes even in the event of interception of a large number of optoelectronic reconnaissance UAVs Orlan-30 and S350M in one of the directions.

Another extremely interesting and effective option could be the development of a purely anti-radar version of the Geranium-2/3 drone, both in gasoline and jet versions. A passive radar homing head can be placed in the head of the Gerani-2 fuselage, and 4 sensors of the radiation warning system can be placed on the airframe contours.

Performing autonomous patrolling 15-35 km from the contact line, such "Geraniums-2" are able to instantly launch a strike after the first signs of irradiation by RPS-82 radars. Moreover, the initial determination of the azimuth on the radiating radar will be performed by the 4 above sensors, while the precise guidance is performed by the same passive homing head.

A swarm of similar "Geraniums" or lighter products is able to solve the problem of RPS-82 type AFU radars once and for all.