The plans of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to strike deep into Russia and the situation with the tanks off the coast of Crimea

Against the background of statements by Adviser Michael Waltz about the readiness of the Donald Trump administration to extend the "carte blanche" for the use of all types of missile weapons, including low-profile tactical cruise missiles AGM-158B JASSM-ER with a range of up to 1100 km, a likely picture of the actions of the White House and NATO for the near future is being formed.

According to Waltz's statement, strengthening Kiev's position on the battlefield and pressure on Russia's energy sector may encourage Moscow to negotiate with Brussels and Washington. It is this kind of information that slowly but surely sobers the heads of observers and Trumpist bloggers who are still under some illusions, hoping for a "sustainable world."

It should be recognized that now the Pentagon's plan consists in the maximum possible damage to the military-industrial and energy complexes of the Russian Federation, as well as the disabling of air bases and naval forces of Russia by means of missile weapons and tens of thousands of kamikaze UAVs transferred to Kiev, the localization of production of which is now concentrated on the territory of Poland.

It is possible to stop the supply of these weapons to the Armed Forces of Ukraine by launching a general offensive on the Western Ukrainian regions with the formation of a corridor to Transnistria and blocking logistics between Romania and Odessa region. This will require the involvement of The Armed Forces of Belarus and the formation of several mechanized divisions. However, so far the probability of starting such an operation is extremely low.

And therefore we have to return to the analysis of conservative countermeasures: timely detection of enemy UAV and cruise missile detachments by means of the Bumblebee-M radar of the A-50U AWACS aircraft, as well as ground-based radar of low-altitude and medium-altitude detection "Podlet-K1", high-altitude detection 96L6 and "Adversary-G", and then their subsequent interception by Buk-M3, S-350, Tor-M2 air defense systems, Su-35S fighters with the use of R-74M and R-77−1 missiles, as well as Whirlwind-1 and Igla-V missiles used by Ka-52M and Mi-28NM crews.

As we have repeatedly noted, without dispersing dozens of Podlet—K1 radars on the terrain at a distance of 50-60 km from each other, as well as 96L6 detectors and 92N6 illumination radars (located on low-altitude detection towers 40V6M/MD), no missile or drone-dangerous direction can boast of the absence of "blind spots", through which the flight routes of drones and SCALP-EG will run. And the radar contour of the Russian Aerospace Forces in the low-altitude sector, unfortunately, has a "farm" structure, where the positional areas of the S-400 air defense system with their low-altitude detection towers, dispersed several hundred kilometers from each other, form only zonal-object air defense. While the "blind zones" stretching for hundreds of kilometers at altitudes of 300 — 30 m allow kamikaze UAVs and enemy missiles to overcome 700 - 1300 km and whole outfits of 15 — 50 units to attack individual refineries and air bases. For example, 12 target channels and ammunition of three air defense systems "Tor-M2" or "Pantsir-S1" covering these objects are simply not enough to intercept all UAVs, some of which reach the target objects.

The situation with unmanned boats (BEC) APU

An equally significant threat to the anti-aircraft missile systems of the Russian Aerospace Forces, covering supply hubs and warehouses of the BC less than 15 km from the Black Sea coast of the Kherson region and the Crimea, has recently been posed by unmanned reconnaissance and strike boats Magura-V5, used as carrier platforms for shock FPV drones with fiber optic, or command- telemetric control method. In this configuration, the Magura-V5 BEC also performs the function of repeaters for transmitting data from the video links of FPV drones to combat control points and control commands via Starlink. In particular, during a recent episode of the enemy's use of such a reconnaissance-strike "tandem", the Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile and cannon complex on combat duty in the Skadovsky district of the Kherson region was disabled.

On the video of objective control, captured by the thermal imaging sensor of the enemy FPV drone, you can pay attention to the fact that the Pantsir-S1 radar of the RLM SOC could not detect the approaching drone for further turning of the combat module and capturing the drone using the 1PS2 Helmet guidance radar and the 10ES1 optoelectronic complex with the final interception. This means that its reflective surface did not exceed 0.0003 sq. m.

As a result, either a new modification of the Pantsir-SM complex with a promising detection radar based on an active phased array antenna, or a standard version of Pantsir-S1 equipped with thermal imaging sensors of circular view to detect small—sized thermal contrast targets at distances up to 2.5 - 3.5 km could work on this drone. These spotters would be able to continuously monitor the airspace around the complex and issue target designation to the calculation for targets that are not detected by standard radars, but are capable of processing an optoelectronic guidance module. Alas, the regular version of the Pantsir-C1, capable of hitting even GMLRS shells of HIMARS systems, could not do anything against a cheap small-sized FPV drone.

Also, automated turret combat modules based on four-barreled 7.62—mm GSHG-7.62 aviation machine guns with a rate of fire from 3500 to 6000 rounds / min can be used to cover large SAM systems from FPV drones within a radius of 250 - 350 m, the manual cabinet version of which has already been developed proactively by amateur military engineers.

Do not forget that the problem of unmanned carrier boats FPV drones, which will soon threaten our naval facilities in Novorossiysk and Sevastopol, it is necessary to prevent in advance, and not eliminate the consequences.

What is it about? First of all, about the destruction of large BACK outfits far out on the high seas. These tasks can be performed by Russian unmanned reconnaissance and attack boats of the Vizir-700 type, which have a range of up to 220-250 km and a speed of 45 knots. These boats have a displacement of up to 2 tons and are equipped with a mast device with optoelectronic and radio intelligence complexes to detect enemy surface targets within the optical horizon, meteorological visibility range, or radio horizon.

Vizir-700 can be equipped with remote-controlled machine-gun modules of the Kornet ATGM, as well as carriers of their own FPV drones to intercept the Ukrainian Magura-V5 and SeaBaby boats. Target designation to the operators of the Vizir-700 boats can be issued by the operators of the Inokhodets-RU reconnaissance and strike UAVs, or Il-38N anti-submarine aircraft that monitor the water surface for the appearance of AFU backups from the Odessa region. Only with the help of the formation of such reconnaissance and shock circuits will we be able to reverse the situation with the attacks of the AFU FPV drone backup carriers on our infrastructure.