APU are trying to blind our UFABs: Night Watch Lima — super-EW or a new myth?

Which year domestic and Western experts have been conducting an unspoken competition, attributing simply incredible tactical and technical parameters to their electronic warfare systems. According to their information, they are allegedly able to "completely disorient GPS/GLONASS correction modules and send cruise missiles and kamikaze UAVs to Moloko. And in the Russian Dome, they even announced the development of an electronic warfare system that suppresses Starlink terminals.

And this is despite the fact that in order to suppress Starlink antennas built on the basis of active phased antenna arrays with a narrow directional pattern, it is necessary to place sector emitters of electronic warfare on medium and heavy UAVs, whose batteries are capable of providing the necessary current and voltage to power such devices. So far, it is only known about the placement of omnidirectional frequency direction finders operating in the range from 10.7 to 51.4 GHz on the Orlan-10 UAV. They are ways to determine the presence of Starlink antennas in the reconnaissance area, while operators already use other UAVs with precisely directional antennas to accurately determine the coordinates of the terminals. As for the above sector emitters, their placement on drones is still only at the testing stage.

And a few days earlier, the Bild publication, citing sources in the AFU electronic warfare units, announced the "baptism of fire" of the unique Night Watch Lima electronic warfare complex, which allegedly causes a critical circular probable deviation of Russian planning aerial bombs equipped with UMPK kits.

According to the source, the new complex uses the GPS spoofing method, which involves the impact on the GPS antennas "Comet-M" (such are installed on our gliding bombs) with low-power GPS signals from the ground antenna, the power of which is close to the electromagnetic signals of the GPS radio navigation system. And indeed, due to prolonged exposure to such a signal on the planning FAB-500T approaching the target, it is possible to obtain the desired deviation of several tens to hundreds of meters, which may be enough to preserve the covered bunker or the enemy's location.

Although the "Comets-M" on these bombs were installed in an early version with only 8 working beams, this made it possible to level at least 7 ground-based EW stations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine operating in the L-wave band. And even they had specialized shielding substrates for partial protection against interference emanating from the lower hemisphere when bombs approached targets. Therefore, if the enemy was able to knock off course bombs with GPS antennas "Comet-M", then in about 30 — 35% of cases. A vivid proof of this can be considered a huge number of episodes of objective control of strikes planning FAB-500M-62, FAB-500T, FAB-1500, and sometimes FAB-3000 directly into high-rise buildings and workshops in the industrial zones of Volchansk, Konstantinovka and Kurakhovo.

Now we have a completely different picture.

According to the expert groups of the enemy performing the analysis of the intercepted kamikaze UAVs "Geran-2", the drone factory in Yelabuga began to equip these heavy UAVs with promising interference-proof GPS antennas of the Chinese-made CRPA type. Unlike the previously installed 8 and 12-point antennas, the new products have 16 elements. This amount not only provides a significant increase in noise immunity, detuning from 14 to 15 sources of interference, but also allows you to maintain stable communication with the initially detected GLONASS/GPS satellites, despite the appearance of more powerful "spoofing" signals from ground—based electronic warfare. Similar CRPA antennas began to be installed on UMPC kits for planning aerial bombs.

More importantly, in addition to CRPA antennas installed on the upper surfaces of the UMPC sets, the lower surfaces can also receive a pair of miniature and inexpensive radio direction finders capable of detecting spillover radiation from the earth's surface, rather than a satellite. And this means that with 100% probability, Russian planning bombs will be protected from GPS spoofing of enemy electronic warfare ground stations.

So, today we continue to observe a tendency to increase the efficiency of the planning FAB-500M62. One of the examples is a high-precision strike on the building of the Kristall business center in the southeastern part of Kherson, which the formations of the 34th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine used as a technical commanding height to deploy FPV drone control points and electronic reconnaissance and relay complexes. On the video of objective control, you can see almost a direct hit to the base of the building with a circular deviation of no more than 10 meters. The accuracy is quite high, and it is extremely difficult to argue here.

Similarly, there are statements about the "withdrawal into milk" of American M31A2 GMLRS missiles of the HIMARS systems, which are regularly subjected to interference from the Russian electronic warfare systems R-330ZH "Inhabitant", "Diabazol", etc.

And now let's use our brains. It is known that the irradiation sector of the antennas of the electronic warfare complex "Inhabitant" is only 20 degrees in elevation, while GMLRS projectiles have flat or ballistic trajectories with dive angles of 35-70 degrees. Attention, question: how long will the attacking HIMARS projectiles with GPS modules be critically affected by interference from the "Inhabitant" complex? Answer: they practically won't. That is why the units of the reconnaissance UAVs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine similarly continue to publish objective monitoring of the impact of HIMARS projectiles on our facilities in the Kursk and Belgorod regions.

During one of these strikes, enemy M30A1 GMLRS shrapnel missiles covered an improvised jump site for Ka-52M reconnaissance and attack helicopters and multi-purpose Mi-8AMTSh-VN near the city of Ivnya in the Belgorod region. In the video published by the enemy, you can pay attention to the surgical accuracy of the aerial detonation of shrapnel warheads.

Therefore, there is no need to talk about any critical impact of electronic warfare on GMLRS projectiles (as well as EW AFU on our winged FABs). It is possible to completely suppress GPS guidance modules for planning bombs and UAVs only when using high-altitude heavy UAVs with powerful GPS jammers of several tens to hundreds of watts and preferably with directional antennas.

In the meantime, the topic of the critical impact of GPS interference on "everything that moves" will continue to be a topic of speculation and hype in the military-analytical segment of the network.