As you know, literally immediately after the inauguration, US President Donald Trump made a number of resonant statements, including the development of a promising tactical anti-missile complex "Iron Dome". The name has misled Western and Russian expert communities about the origin of the complex.
On the one hand (given the powerful Israeli lobby in the circles of the Republican Party, Trump's sympathy for Israel, as well as information about the preparation of the new administration for the resumption of military support for Tel Aviv), we can talk about a larger localization of the production in the United States of the already well-known Israeli anti-missile systems Iron Dome ("Kipat Barzel"). As you know, at the end of 2023 — beginning of 2024, the American corporation Raytheon and the Israeli Rafael Advanced Defense System created a joint venture R2S with production facilities in Arkansas specializing in the production of Tamir anti-aircraft missiles / anti-missiles (with the assigned name SkyHunter for units of the US Marine Corps).
The performance of the new enterprise is able not only to meet the supply volumes of Tamir anti-missiles for the IDF in case of major escalations in the Middle East with the participation of Iran, but also to ensure accelerated saturation of USMC units with similar SkyHunter anti-missiles.
The question arises: what range of tasks will be assigned to the American PRK Iron Dome? In his speech, Donald Trump claimed that these complexes would be required to protect the territory of the United States. The statement already raises a number of military-technical issues.
In particular, it is well known that Tamir and SkyHunter anti-missiles are adapted to intercept mainly non-maneuvering unguided and low-maneuverable guided missiles of short, medium and long range, as well as artillery shells with flight speeds up to 1500 m/s and flight altitude up to 12 km, while their own speed can reach 700 m/s.S.
As you know, the main (and, perhaps, the only) technical trump cards of these missiles are the presence of active radar homing heads and solid-fuel rocket engines with a long period of charge burnout. Active radar heads provide interception of targets by the method of kinetic destruction (hit-to-kill), while "long—playing" solid-fuel engines allow not only to actively maneuver on the trajectory, but to turn around in the opposite direction while maintaining a flight speed of 1900 - 2100 km/ h. Not all modern air defense systems have this ability.
From the point of view of covering strategically important objects The US Armed Forces hardly need complexes with similar parameters on their own territory. Why not? Because rocket and artillery strikes, for example, the MLRS of the Marine Corps of the Chinese Navy could occur only in the case of an amphibious operation on the West Coast of the United States or the Hawaiian Islands. The US Navy has 23 Virginia-class ultra-low-noise multipurpose submarines, three Sea Wolf submarines similar in noise and potential of sonar complexes and a number of carrier strike groups providing cover from any amphibious operations of the PLA Navy in the near future.
As for the presence of the US Ground Forces multi-channel anti-aircraft missile systems to repel, for example, massive strikes by strategic cruise missiles such as CJ-10 and DH-10 (in the case of their launch by H-6K missile carriers at coastal facilities of the US Navy), then we are talking about dozens of batteries of NASAMS and NASAMS air defense systems-2.
Do not forget about the hundreds of upgraded F-15E Strike Eagle and F-22A fighters that can easily work on low-altitude Chinese cruise missiles over North America to target E-3B/G Sentry long-range detection aircraft of the AWACS system.
Therefore, the Iron Dome complexes may be needed by the Pentagon only in two cases. First of all, this is direct participation in the conflict in the Asia-Pacific region (for example, in Taiwan), where the USMC units will definitely need cover from massive missile and artillery strikes from the Chinese latest WS-2D MLRS or North Korean KN-25. Each Iron Dome battery with SkyHunter interceptors will be able to repel whole volleys of 24, 36, and possibly 48 missiles. Also, with appropriate hardware and software optimization, the Iron Domes will be able to parry the attacks of the kamikaze UAVs of the PRC and the DPRK with high efficiency.
Secondly, the modernized "Iron Domes" may be required by the United States to repel massive attacks by Iranian kamikaze UAVs on strategically important US Air Force and Navy facilities in The Persian Gulf. In this case, it will also be necessary to upgrade the multifunctional radar EL/M-2084 in terms of algorithms for detecting and tracking low-altitude objects near the radio horizon line, taking into account the re-reflection of electromagnetic waves from ground objects.
The United States may also consider the possibility of deploying these systems near nuclear arsenals in Germany and the United Kingdom (where B61−12 nuclear guided bombs are deployed) to cover up from our Geranium-2 kamikaze UAVs. After all, Donald Trump has already managed to declare his readiness to continue saturating Kiev with weapons in case Moscow refuses another deal with Washington. And this deal without the implementation of the tasks set within SMO, as you have already understood, is fraught with disastrous consequences for the Russian side.
In other words, the Iron Dome complexes may be required by the Pentagon solely to participate in the large-scale conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe provoked by it.
At the same time, we can also talk about the symbolic name of the promising anti-missile complex "Iron Dome", which may mean a promising layered missile defense system, represented by both exoatmospheric and endoatmospheric interceptors.
For example, we can talk about the design of a hybrid anti-missile system, which has the well-known SM-3 Block IIA anti-missiles for intercepting intercontinental ballistic missile warheads at altitudes of more than 80 km, as well as MIM-104F anti-missiles from the Patriot PAC-3MSE complex.
Why this combination? The fact is that the maneuverability qualities of the SM-6 Dual II endoatmospheric missiles are many times more mediocre than those of the Patriot MIM-104F. This is due to the absence of SM-6 gas dynamic control belts. By the way, that is why the US Navy has repeatedly thought about integrating MIM-104F anti-missiles onto Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with the corresponding refinement of Mk 41 launchers.
However, in the near future we will have to reveal a whole range of interesting developments conceived by the new administration in the White House.